Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Borda voting is non-manipulable but cloning manipulation is possible

Islam, Jamal and Mohajan, Haradhan and Moolio, Pahlaj (2011): Borda voting is non-manipulable but cloning manipulation is possible. Published in: International Journal of Development Research and Quantitative Techniques , Vol. 2, No. 1 (30 June 2012): pp. 28-37.


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This paper deals with Borda count which is sincere voting system and originally proposed by French mathematician and philosopher Jeans-Charles Borda. In Borda count a defeated candidate can manipulate the election result in his favor in sincere way by introducing a candidate which is a clone of him and voters ranked this clone candidate immediately below him. In this situation Borda rule is strictly follows but manipulation is possible. The paper shows that this type of manipulation is vulnerable. Both single and simultaneous vulnerabilities of cloning manipulations are discussed with detail calculations and easier ways.

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