Cross-Checking the Media

Rudiger, Jesper (2013): Cross-Checking the Media.

Abstract

A characteristic of the news market is that consumers often cross-check information, i.e. observe several news outlets. At the same time, data on political media suggest that more partisan consumers are more likely to cross-check. We explore these phenomena by building a model of horizontal competition in newspaper endorsements. Without cross-checking, outlets are unbiased and minimally differentiated. When cross-checking is allowed, we show that cross-checkers are indeed more partisan than those who only acquire one report. Furthermore, cross-checking induces outlets to differentiate, and the degree of differentiation is increasing in the dispersion of consumer beliefs. Differentiation is detrimental to consumer welfare, and a single monopoly outlet may provide higher consumer welfare than a competitive duopoly.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: News Markets; Media Bias; Cross-checking; Hotelling
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness; L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce

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