Cai, Hongbin and Wang, Miaojun and Yan, Se (2014): Why Do Large Firms Willingly Pay High Wages in Developing Countries?
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Abstract
Using a simple game-theoretical model, this paper provides a new explanation for why large firms in developing economies may willingly pay higher wages than market wage rate. We show that large firms can strategically create entry barriers to the modern sector by setting high wage standards. They may do so to reduce competition or to distort the government's resource allocation. Focusing on the latter case, we also show that the size of the primitive sector will be larger than the efficient level, and public resource allocation will be biased in favor of incumbent large businesses despite the benevolent nature of the government. Using a survey of Chinese industrial firms, we find that industrial concentration is positively correlated with the size-wage effect, and such effect is stronger in less developed provinces. These findings are consistent with our theoretical prediction.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Why Do Large Firms Willingly Pay High Wages in Developing Countries? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | size-wage effect; entry deterrence; government resource allocation |
Subjects: | J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J42 - Monopsony ; Segmented Labor Markets L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms |
Item ID: | 53538 |
Depositing User: | Dr Se Yan |
Date Deposited: | 10 Feb 2014 14:28 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 04:51 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/53538 |