Is Economics Entering its Post-Witchcraft Era?

Potgieter, Petrus H. and Rosinger, Elemér E. (2007): Is Economics Entering its Post-Witchcraft Era?

Abstract

Recently, an awareness is emerging in economics about the fact that important problems are not solvable algorithmically, that is, by any finite number of steps. This statement can be made mathematically exact and this paper reviews the contributions that have been made in this regard, related to standard topics in economics.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: University of South Africa
• Language: English
• Keywords: Computability economics; general equilibrium theory; Arrow's impossibility theorem; Debreu's theorem; Game Theory; Malleus Maleficiarum
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists

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