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Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem

De, Parikshit (2013): Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem.

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We identify the complete class of transfer rules that guarantee strategyproofness of any non-increasing in completion time allocation rule for the sequencing problem. We then characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying efficiency of decision (or aggregate cost minimization), egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness. There is no mechanism in this class that satisfies either feasibility or weak group strategyproofness. Finally we identify the restrictions under which egalitarian equivalence, efficiency of decision, identical preference lower bound and strategyproofness are compatible.

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