Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem

De, Parikshit (2013): Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem.

Abstract

We identify the complete class of transfer rules that guarantee strategyproofness of any non-increasing in completion time allocation rule for the sequencing problem. We then characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying efficiency of decision (or aggregate cost minimization), egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness. There is no mechanism in this class that satisfies either feasibility or weak group strategyproofness. Finally we identify the restrictions under which egalitarian equivalence, efficiency of decision, identical preference lower bound and strategyproofness are compatible.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Sequencing problems; Strategyproofness; Egalitarian equivalence; Identical preference lower bound
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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