Endogenous Reputation Formation: Cooperation and Identity under the Shadow of the Future

Kamei, Kenju (2015): Endogenous Reputation Formation: Cooperation and Identity under the Shadow of the Future.

Abstract

People are interacting more with strangers thanks to recent technological advancement in online platforms. Online interactions can be characterized by infinitely-repeated games. Recent studies have shown that institutions that make people’s decisions open to others may enhance cooperation in these situations. But it is still unknown whether people can successfully cooperate with each other by choosing to show their identities and building good reputation when there is an option to hide them. We deal with this question using an experimental laboratory. Our experiment shows that a non-negligible fraction of people conceal their identities and people fail to cooperate with each other if hiding identities is free. However, almost all show their identities and successfully achieve cooperation with their partners if a small explicit cost is charged for act of hiding.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: experiment, cooperation, reputation, prisoner dilemma game, internet, infinitely-repeated games
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M2 - Business Economics > M21 - Business Economics

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