Armstrong, Mark (2015): Search and ripoff externalities.
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Abstract
This paper surveys models of markets in which only some consumers are "savvy". I discuss when the presence of savvy consumers improves the deals available to all consumers in the market (the case of search externalities), and when the non-savvy fund generous deals for all consumers (ripoff externalities). I also discuss when the two groups of consumers have aligned or divergent views about market interventions. The analysis focusses on two kinds of models: (i) an indivisible product in a market with price dispersion, and (ii) products which involve add-on pricing.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Search and ripoff externalities |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Add-on pricing, bounded rationality, consumer protection, consumer search, externalities, price dispersion |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D18 - Consumer Protection D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance |
Item ID: | 62012 |
Depositing User: | Mark Armstrong |
Date Deposited: | 11 Feb 2015 14:28 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 11:39 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/62012 |