Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. and Ulungu, Berthold E.-L. (2014): Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory. Published in: International Journal of Applied Mathematical Research , Vol. 4, No. 1 (27 January 2015): pp. 177-182.

Abstract

This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting system.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Aggregation, Approval Voting, Borda Majority Count, Majority Judgment, Social Choice Function.
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925 > B16 - Quantitative and Mathematical; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C10 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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