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Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. and Ulungu, Berthold E.-L. (2014): Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory. Published in: International Journal of Applied Mathematical Research , Vol. 4, No. 1 (27 January 2015): pp. 177-182.

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Abstract

This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting system.

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