Incorporating Phenotype Plasticity into the Indirect Evolutionary Approach

Schmitt, Rebecca (2015): Incorporating Phenotype Plasticity into the Indirect Evolutionary Approach.

Abstract

Up to now, the Indirect Evolutionary Approach (IEA) has been based on phenotypes which are represented by unchangeable preference parameters and, as a consequence, by time-invariant utility functions. Here we introduce phenotype plasticity into the IEA by providing a model which includes changeable individual preference parameters. We show that such phenotype plasticity can be a stable phenomenon in a stable environment. For 2x2 symmetric evolutionary games, we identify conditions under which a population of non-plastic phenotypes can be invaded by mutants of a plastic phenotype, but not by mutants of a non-plastic phenotype.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Evolutionary Games, Indirect Evolution, Preference Theory, Taste, Instability of Preferences, Evolution of Preferences
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D10 - General; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory

References

Aronson, Elliot. 1992. “The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback”. Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 3 (4), 303–311.

Barker, James S. F. 2009. “Defining Fitness in Natural and Domesticated Populations” in: Adaption and Fitness in Animal Populations. (Ed.): Gondro, C. / Graser H.-U. / Frankham, R. / van der Werf, J., 3-14. Heidelberg: Springer Science + Business Media B. V.

Becker, Gary S. and Stigler, George. 1977. “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum”. The American Economic Review, Vol. 67, 76-90.

Bester, Helmut and Güth, Werner. 1998. “Is altruism evolutionary stable?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 34, 193-209.

Boylan, Richard T. 1992. “Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals”. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 57, 473-504.

Cooper, Joel., & Fazio, Russel. H. 1984. “A new look at dissonance theory”. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, 229-262. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Cox, James C., Friedman Daniel and Gjerstad, Steven. 2007. “A tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness”. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 59, 17–45.

Duffie, Darrell and Sun, Yeneng. 2012. “The exact law of large numbers for independent random matching”. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 147, 1105-1139.

Fagen, Robert. 1987. “Phenotypic Plasticity and Social Environment”. Evolutionary Ecology, 263-271.

Fehr, Ernst and Henrich, Jospeh. 2004. “Is strong reciprocity a maladaption? On the evolutionary foundations of human altruism”. In: P. Hammerstein (Ed.), Genetic and cultural origins of cooperation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Fehr, Ernst and Schmidt, Klaus. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 817-868.

Güth, Werner. 1995. “An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives”. International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 24, 232-344.

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Levati, M. Vittoria; von Wangenheim, Georg. 2007. “On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol. 163 (1), 143-157.

Güth, Werner and Ockenfels, Axel. 2000. “Evolutionary Norm Enforcement”. Journal of Instututional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 156, 335-347.

Güth, Werner and Yaari, Menachen. 1992. “Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An evolutoinary Approach.” In: Witt, Ulrich (Hrsg.). Explaining process and change, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1992, 23-34.

Kockesen, Levent, Ok, Efe A., and Sethi, Rajiv. 1998. “Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggergative Games”. C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics. Economic Research Reports 98-19. New York University.

Königstein, Manfred and Müller, Wieland. 2000. “Combining Rational Choice and Evolutionary Dynamics. The indirect Evolutionary Approach”. Metroeconomica, 51:3, 235-256.

Levine, David K. 1997. “Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments”. Working Paper, UCLA, Department of Economics.

Mills, Susan K. and Beatty, John H. 2006. “The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness”. In: Sober. Elliott (Editioner): Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Bradford Books. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Ockenfels, Peter. 1993. “Cooperation in Prisoners’ Dilemma. An Evolutionary Approach” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 9, 567-579.

Ok, Efe and Vega-Redondo, Fernando. 2001. “On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: An Incomplete Information Scenario”. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 97, 231-254.

Possajennikov, Alex. 2000. “On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 42, 125-129.

Schmitt, Rebecca. 2010. “Eine evolutionstheoretische Fundierung zeitvarianter Fairnesspräferenzen”. S. Roderer Verlag, Regensburg.

Sethi, Rajiv and Somanathan, E. 2001. “Preference Evolution and Reciprocity”. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 97, 273-297.

West-Eberhard, Mary J. 2003. “Developmental Plasticity and Evolution”. Oxford University Press.