Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining

Damiani, Mirella and Ricci, Andrea (2016): Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining.

Abstract

Abstract The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train each other.

Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Keywords: Training; Compensation; Management; Education
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M53 - Training

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