Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Transnational Policing: Preemption and Deterrence against Elusive Perpetrators

Nakao, Keisuke (2016): Transnational Policing: Preemption and Deterrence against Elusive Perpetrators.

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Why does a state directly police certain kinds of transnational perpetrators by itself while indirectly policing other kinds through their host government? To address this question, we develop a formal model, where Defender chooses either to police Perpetrators or to make Proxy do so. According to our theory, the delegation of policing can enhance its effectiveness in light of Proxy’s advantages in threatening, identifying, and attacking Perpetrators, but it may also cause inefficiency if Defender has limited information about Proxy’s choice or cost of policing. Depending on the relative size between these advantages and disadvantages, one of the following four forms of policing may emerge: (i) Defender polices Perpetrators on her own (e.g., Somali counter-piracy operations); (ii) Defender induces Proxy to police Perpetrators (U.S. War on Drugs); (iii) Defender and Proxy together police Perpetrators (Operation Inherent Resolve); (iv) two or more Defender-Proxy states police Perpetrators in each’s own domain (Interpol).

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