Transnational Policing: Preemption and Deterrence against Elusive Perpetrators

Nakao, Keisuke (2016): Transnational Policing: Preemption and Deterrence against Elusive Perpetrators.

Abstract

Why does a state directly police certain kinds of transnational perpetrators by itself while indirectly policing other kinds through their host government? To address this question, we develop a formal model, where Defender chooses either to police Perpetrators or to make Proxy do so. According to our theory, the delegation of policing can enhance its effectiveness in light of Proxy’s advantages in threatening, identifying, and attacking Perpetrators, but it may also cause inefficiency if Defender has limited information about Proxy’s choice or cost of policing. Depending on the relative size between these advantages and disadvantages, one of the following four forms of policing may emerge: (i) Defender polices Perpetrators on her own (e.g., Somali counter-piracy operations); (ii) Defender induces Proxy to police Perpetrators (U.S. War on Drugs); (iii) Defender and Proxy together police Perpetrators (Operation Inherent Resolve); (iv) two or more Defender-Proxy states police Perpetrators in each’s own domain (Interpol).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: cyberattack, deterrence, policing, piracy, preemption, terrorism
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F52 - National Security ; Economic Nationalism; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

References

Atzili, Boaz, and Wendy Pearlman. 2012. “Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength, Beaten by Weakness.” Security Studies. 21(2): 301-335.

Bar, Samuel. 2008. “Deterring Terrorism: What Israel Has Learned.” Policy Review. 149: 29-42.

Betts, Richard K. 2002. “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror.” Political Science Quarterly. 117(1): 19-36.

Bowen, Wyn Q. 2004. “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism.” Contemporary Security Policy. 25(1): 54-70.

Buzzard, Anthony. W. 1956. “Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence.” World Politics. 8(2): 228-237.

Byman, Daniel. 2005. “Passive Sponsors of Terrorism.” Survival. 47(4): 117-144.

Carter, David B. 2012. “A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Group.” International Organization. 66(1): 129-151.

Clarke, Richard A., and Robert K. Knake. 2010. Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Colby, Elbridge. 2008. “Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation.” Policy Review. 149: 43-59.

Davis, Paul K., and Brian Michael Jenkins. 2002. Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Davis, Paul K., and Brian Michael Jenkins. 2004. “A System Approach to Deterring and Influencing Terrorists.” Conflict Management and Peace Science. 21(1): 3-15.

Fearon, James D. 1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41(1): 68-90.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. Deterrence. London, UK: Polity Press.

Forero, Juan. 2003. “Colombia Rebels Admit Kidnapping 3 Americans After Crash.” New York Times. February 23.

George, Alexander L. 2002. “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Model of Adversaries.” In Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post, eds. Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures. Maxwell Air Force Base, AK: United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center.

Gordon, Michael R. 2015. “Kurds, Backed by U.S. Air Power, Try to Regain Sinjar From ISIL.” New York Times. November 12.

Gray, Colin. 2003. “The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On.” Comparative Strategy. 22(5): 429-461.

Harvey, Frank. 1998. “Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic.” International Studies Quarterly. 42(4): 675-707.

Heymann, Philip B. 2001/02. “Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview.” International Security. 26(3): 24-38.

Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. 1988. “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation.” International Studies Quarterly. 32(1): 29-46.

Isacson, Adam. 2005. “Failing Grades: Evaluating the Results of Plan Colombia.” Yale Journal of International Affairs. Summer/Fall: 138-154.

Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines. 2011. “U.S. Ambassador Visits JSOTF-P in Southern Philippines.” March 24.

Knopf, Jeffrey W. 2008. “Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy after 9/11.” Contemporary Security Policy. 29(2): 248-253.

Knopf, Jeffrey W. 2012. “Terrorism and the Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research.” In Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner, eds. Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kroenig, Matthew, and Barry Pavel. 2012. “How to Deter Terrorism.” Washington Quarterly. 35(2): 21-36.

Lebovic, James H. 2009. Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy After 9/11. New York: Routledge.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Levy, Jack S. 1988. “Review Article: When Do Deterrent Threats Work?” British Journal of Political Science. 18(4): 485-512.

Miller, Gregory D. 2013. “Terrorist Decision Making and the Deterrence Problem.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 36(2): 132-151.

Miller, Judith, and Michael Wines. 2002. “Sharon Tentatively Backs Plan for Palestinian State.” New York Times. December 5.

Mote, Frederick W. 1999. Imperial China: 900-1800. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nitze, Paul. H. 1956. “Atoms, Strategy, and Policy.” Foreign Affairs. 34(2): 187-198.

Olson, Eric L. and Christopher E. Wilson. 2010. “Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation.” Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation. Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego.

Payne, Keith B. 2003. “The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction.” Comparative Strategy. 22(5): 411-428.

Reuter, Peter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave. 1988. Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Sageman, Marc. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Salehyan, Idean. 2009. Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sandler, Todd, and Kevin Siqueira. 2006. “Global Terrorism: Deterrence Versus Pre-Emption.” Canadian Journal of Economics. 39(4): 1370-1387.

Sartori, Anne R. 2007. Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Scahill, Jeremy. 2013. Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield. New York: Nation Books.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Schmidt, Michael S., and Eric Schmitt. 2016. “U.S. Plans to Step Up Military Campaign Against ISIS.” New York Times. April 17.

Shanglin, Luan. 2006. “SCO to Intensify Fight against Cross-Border Drug Crimes.” China View. April 22.

Smelser, Neil J., and Faith Mitchell, eds. 2002. Discouraging Terrorism: Some Implications of 9/11. Washington D.C.: National Academies Press.

Steinberg, Gerald M. 2001. “Rediscovering Deterrence After September 11, 2001.” Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints. No. 467(17).

Stokes, Doug. 2005. America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. New York: Zed Books.

Tanaka, Takeo. 2012. Wakou: Umi no Rekishi [Japanese Pirates: History of the Sea]. Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha.

Trager, Robert F., and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. 2005/06. “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done.” International Security. 30(3): 87-123.

Whiteneck, Daniel. 2005. “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework.” Washington Quarterly. 28(3): 187-199.

Wilner, Alex S. 2011. “Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 34(1): 3-37.