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Pricing and Liquidity in Decentralized Asset Markets

Uslu, Semih (2015): Pricing and Liquidity in Decentralized Asset Markets.

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Abstract

I develop a search-and-bargaining model of liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets where investors differ in their search intensities. A distinguishing characteristic of my model is its tractability: it allows for heterogeneity, unrestricted asset positions, and fully decentralized trade. I find that investors with higher search intensities (i.e., fast investors) are less averse to holding inventories and more attracted to cash earnings, which makes the model corroborate a number of stylized facts that do not emerge from existing models: (i) fast investors provide intermediation by charging a speed premium, and (ii) fast investors hold larger and more volatile inventories. Then, I use the model to study the effect of trading frictions on the supply and price of liquidity. The results have policy implications concerning the Volcker rule.

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