On Top-connected Single-peaked and Partially Single-peaked Domains

Achuthankutty, Gopakumar and Roy, Souvik (2017): On Top-connected Single-peaked and Partially Single-peaked Domains.

Abstract

We characterize all domains for which the set of unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions coincides with the set of min-max rules. As an application of our result, we obtain a characterization of unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on maximal single-peaked domains (Moulin (1980), Weymark (2011)), minimally rich single-peaked domains (Peters et al. (2014)), maximal regular single-crossing domain (Saporiti (2009)), and distance based single-peaked domains. We further consider domains that exhibit single-peaked property only over a subset of alternatives. We call such domains top-connected partially single-peaked domains. We characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function on such domains. As an application of this result, we obtain a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on multiple single-peaked domains (Reffgen (2015)), single-peaked domains on graphs, and several other domains of practical significance.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Strategy-proofness, min-max rules, min-max domains, single-peaked preferences,top-connectedness property, partially single-peaked preferences, partly dictatorial generalized median voter schemes.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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