Antelo, Manel and Bru, Lluís (2016): Option contracts in a vertical industry.
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Abstract
We examine, in a vertical industry, the strategic role of horizontal subcontracting through option contracts by a downstream dominant firm competing with a competitive fringe. Downstream production requires an input from an upstream component-producing industry composed of imperfectly competitive suppliers. We characterize how the dominant firm may outsource downstream production from fringe firms in order to gain bargaining clout in the upstream input market. It is shown that option contracts are preferred to fixed-quantity forward contracts, because leverage against upstream suppliers is gained at lower contract prices. When there is no market uncertainty option contracts do not alter spot prices beyond that caused by unavoidable market power, whereas they increase price volatility whenever demand is subject to uncertainty.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Option contracts in a vertical industry |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Option contracts, forward contracts, vertical industry, demand uncertainty |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L10 - General L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L23 - Organization of Production |
Item ID: | 79241 |
Depositing User: | Dr. Manel Antelo |
Date Deposited: | 21 May 2017 06:14 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 12:27 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/79241 |