Strategy-proof Rules on Partially Single-peaked Domains

Achuthankutty, Gopakumar and Roy, Souvik (2017): Strategy-proof Rules on Partially Single-peaked Domains.

Abstract

We consider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such domains partially single-peaked and provide a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on these domains. As an application of this result, we obtain a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on multi-peaked domains (Stiglitz (1974), Shepsle (1979), Epple and Romano (1996a)), single-peaked domains with respect to a partial order (Chatterji and Massó (2015)), multiple single-peaked domains (Reffgen (2015)) and single-peaked domains on graphs (Schummer and Vohra (2002)). As a by-product of our results, it follows that strategy-proofness implies tops-onlyness on these domains. Further, we show that strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness are equivalent on these domains.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Partially single-peaked domain, strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, partly dictatorial min-max rules.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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