Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Optimal Information Censorship

Ginzburg, Boris (2019): Optimal Information Censorship. Published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , Vol. 163, (July 2019): pp. 377-385.

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This paper analyses Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed receiver in a linear framework. The sender is restricted to censorship, that is, to strategies in which each state is either perfectly revealed or hidden. I develop a new approach to finding optimal censorship strategies based on direct optimisation. I also show how this approach can be used to restrict the set of optimal censorship schemes, and to analyse optimal censorship under certain classes of distributions of the receiver's type.

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