Logo
Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Present Bias in Renewable Resources Management Reduces Agent’s Welfare

Persichina, Marco (2019): Present Bias in Renewable Resources Management Reduces Agent’s Welfare.

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_97144.pdf]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_97144.pdf

Download (456kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper analyses the effects of myopic and present-biased preferences on the welfare of a naive agent when she is engaged in an intertemporal harvesting activity from a stock of renewable resources. The analysis is conducted by taking into account also the nature of present-biased behaviors as phenomena that is derived from a dual system of discounting and of response to short and long-term stimuli. In the task of harvesting from a stock of renewable resources, the present biased preferences of a naive agent create a conflict between the long run benefit of the agent and the short run desire. Thus, this paper demonstrates and argues that in the decision-making, which involves intertemporal choices in renewable resources management, the prevalence of naive behavior, strongly influenced by the emotional-affective system, can lead to a reduction in the overall utility enjoyed by the individual due to the present bias.

Available Versions of this Item

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.