Ning, Haokai (2020): Choice of Trade Policy with Incomplete Information.
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Abstract
This paper studies the design of trade policies in an uncertain third market with incomplete information. Governments in each of the two countries select either direct quantity controls or subsidies in an attempt to shift profits in favour of their own firms in an oligopolistic setting. It is shown that the country with firms having information disadvantage tends to choose the direct quantity control, while the country with well-informed firms would use export subsidy (export quota) when the degree of uncertainty is sufficiently high (low).
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Choice of Trade Policy with Incomplete Information |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Uncertainty, incomplete information, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, strategic trade policy, Cournot competition |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Item ID: | 101529 |
Depositing User: | Haokai Ning |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jul 2020 16:11 |
Last Modified: | 05 Jul 2020 16:11 |
References: | Anam, M. and Chiang, S.-H. (2000) Export market correlation and strategic trade policy, Canadian Journal of Economics, 33, 41–52. Brander, J. A. and Spencer, B. J. (1985) Export subsidies and international market share rivalry, Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100. Caglayan, M. (2000) Uncertainty resolution and strategic trade policy in oligopolistic industries, Review of International Economics, 8, 311–318 Cooper, R. and Riezman, R. (1989) Uncertainty and the choice of trade policy in oligopolistic industries, The Review of Economic Studies, 56, 129–140. Creane, A. and Miyagiwa, K. (2008) Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy, Journal of International Economics, 75, 229–244. Grant, S. and Quiggin, J. (1997) Strategic trade policy under uncertainty: Sufficient conditions for the optimality of ad valorem, specific and quadratic trade taxes, International Economic Review, 38, 187–203. Klemperer, P. D. and Meyer, M. A. (1989) Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty, Econometrica, 57, 1243–1277. Krishna, K. (1989) Trade restrictions as facilitating practices, Journal of International Economics, 26, 251–270. Maggi, G. (1999) Strategic trade policy under incomplete information, International Economic Review, 40, 571–594. Ning, H. (2020a) On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas with incomplete information, manuscript, York University. Ning, H. (2020b) Strategic trade policy in reciprocal dumping model with incomplete information, manuscript, York University. Pearce, D. G. (1984) Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection, Econometrica, 52, 1029–1050. Qui, L. D. (1994) Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information, Journal of International Economics, 36, 333–354. Shivakumar, R. (1993) Strategic trade policy: Choosing between export subsidies and export quotas under uncertainty, Journal of International Economics, 35, 169–183. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/101529 |
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