The interaction of forward guidance in a two-country new Keynesian model

Ida, Daisuke and Iiboshi, Hirokuni (2021): The interaction of forward guidance in a two-country new Keynesian model.

Abstract

Using the method of Haberis and Lipinska (2020), this paper explores the effect of forward guidance (FG) in a two-country New Keynesian (NK) economy under the zero lower bound (ZLB). We simulate the effect of different lengths of FG or the zero interest rate policy under the circumstance of the global liquidity trap. We show that the size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution plays an important role in determining the beggar-thy-neighbor effect or the prosper-thy-neighbor effect of home FG policy on the foreign economy. And in the former case, by targeting a minimum welfare loss of the individual country alone but not global welfare loss, two central banks can perform interesting FG bargaining in which they cooperatively adopt the same length of FG or strategically deviate from cooperation.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Forward guidance; Zero lower bound on nominal interest rates; Two-country new-Keynesian model; Taylor rule
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance > F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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