Perception of Bribery, an Anti-Corruption Campaign, and Health Service Utilization in Vietnam

Yamada, Hiroyuki and Vu, Tien Manh (2021): Perception of Bribery, an Anti-Corruption Campaign, and Health Service Utilization in Vietnam.

Abstract

Although various theoretical predictions have been made, empirical evidence on the impact of bribery remains limited, especially in the health sector. This study explores how the perception of bribery is associated with health service utilization in Vietnam by using provincial panel data during 2012–2018. We found that a higher perception of bribery is associated with fewer inpatient days, suggesting that bribery potentially influences the deterioration of welfare services. However, no such effect on the number of consultations at health facilities and the number of inpatients was detected. In addition, we found that a strong general anti-corruption campaign would offset the negative effects of bribery on the number of inpatient days.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: bribery, health service utilization, anti-corruption campaign, Vietnam
• Subjects: I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I12 - Health Behavior; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I19 - Other

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