Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment

Balafoutas, Loukas and Faravelli, Marco and Sheremeta, Roman (2021): Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment.

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, an actor joins the least crowded lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane represents a contested scarce resource. We vary the actor’s valuation (high and low) for the good through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number of swimmers to proxy for their valuation. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a swimmer’s propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity (incentive effect) and decreases in the actor’s valuation (discouragement effect). We complement the results with survey evidence.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: conflict; conflict resolution; field experiment
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice > D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice ; Life Cycle Models and Saving

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