The real effects of bank lobbying: Evidence from the corporate loan market

Delis, Manthos and Hasan, Iftekhar and To, Thomas and Wu, Eliza (2022): The real effects of bank lobbying: Evidence from the corporate loan market.

Abstract

Using a large sample of corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying, we show that borrower performance improves after receiving credit from lobbying banks. This especially holds for opaque borrowers about which a bank possesses valuable information, as well as for borrowers with strong corporate governance. We also find that credit from lobbying banks funds corporate capital expenditures that increase the scope of firm operations, thereby leading to sales growth. Our findings are consistent with the information-transmission theory that political lobbying provides regulators with valuable borrower information, which results in improved bank-lending supervisory decisions and corporate borrower performance.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bank lobbying; Firm performance; Syndicated loans; Information-transmission
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General

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