Synthesis of equilibrium

Zhukovskiy, Vladislav and Zhukovskaya, Lidia and Smirnova, Lidia (2023): Synthesis of equilibrium. Published in:

Abstract

For a noncooperative N-player normal-form game, we introduce the concept of hybrid equilibrium (HE) by combining the concepts of Nash and Berge equilibria and Pareto maximum. Some properties of hybrid equilibria are explored and their existence in mixed strategies is established under standard assumptions of mathematical game theory (convex and compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions). Similar results are obtained for noncooperative N-player normal-form games under uncertainty.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: uncertainty, mixed strategies, equilibrium, saddle point, Pareto optimality
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C00 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods

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