Water Theft As Social Insurance: Southeastern Spain, 1851-1948

Donna, Javier and Espin Sanchez, Jose (2019): Water Theft As Social Insurance: Southeastern Spain, 1851-1948. Published in: Economic History Review , Vol. 3, No. 74 (2021): pp. 721-753.

Abstract

We investigate the roles of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity on crime. Our analysis reconciles low crime rates with light punishments in self-governed communities (Ostrom, 1990), using formal punishments to deter crime (Becker, 1968). We use a novel trial dataset on water stealing from a self-governed community in Mula, Spain. We present a model with predictions consistent with farmers' behavior in Mula: (i) judges trade off crime deterrence and insurance, recognizing that minimizing crime could be socially inefficient; (ii) punishments depend on the defendant's and victim's characteristics; (iii) recidivists are punished harsher than first time offenders for the same crime.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Crime, Punishment, Enforcement of Law, Self-governed communities.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C13 - Estimation: General; K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K14 - Criminal Law; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks; N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation > N42 - U.S. ; Canada: 1913-; N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation > N43 - Europe: Pre-1913

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