Оливър Уилямсън: новатор на 20 век и основател на новата институционална икономика

Todorova, Tamara (2022): Оливър Уилямсън: новатор на 20 век и основател на новата институционална икономика. Published in: : pp. 1-152.

Abstract

Оливър Уилямсън е роден в град Сюпириър, щата Уисконсин в 1932 в семейство на учители. След като завършва инженерни науки с бакалавърска степен по мениджмънт в Масачузетския технологичен институт, работи като инженер за Дженеръл Електрик и Централното разузнавателно управление. След това продължава обучението си в магистърска степен по бизнес администрация в университета Станфорд. След него продължава с докторат по икономика в университета Карнеги Мелън.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Oliver Williamson: an innovator of the 20th century and founder of the new institutional economics
• Language: Bulgarian
• Keywords: Oliver Williamson; transaction costs; opportunism; contract theory
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B3 - History of Economic Thought: Individuals > B31 - Individuals; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory

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