Makowsky, Michael (2009): Religious Extremism, Clubs, and Civil Liberties: A Model of Religious Populations.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_14358.pdf Download (487kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper extends the club model of religion to better account for observed patterns of extremism. We adapt existing models to a multi-agent framework and analyze the distribution of agents and clubs. We find that extremism is more successful when religious groups are able to produce close substitutes for standard goods and that increased access to publicly provided goods can reduce the extremist population share. Quantile regression modeling of data from a multi-nation survey and institutional indices corresponds to the model’s key results. Our findings offer a mechanism supporting research linking terrorist origination to civil liberties.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Religious Extremism, Clubs, and Civil Liberties: A Model of Religious Populations |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Extremism, Religion, Sacrifice and Stigma, Multi-Agent Model, Civil Liberties |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z12 - Religion C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War |
Item ID: | 14358 |
Depositing User: | Michael Makowsky |
Date Deposited: | 01 Apr 2009 04:13 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 16:25 |
References: | Barros, P. P. and N. Garoupa (2002). "An Economic Theory of Church Strictness." The Economic Journal 112( ): 481-559. Becker, G. S. (1965). "A Theory of the Allocation of Time." The Economic Journal 75(299): 493-517. Berman, E. (2000). "Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews." Quarterly Journal of Economics 65(3): 905-953. Berman, E. (2004). "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias." NBER Working Papers(No. w10004). Bromley, D. G. and J. G. Melton (2002). Cults, religion, and violence. New York, Cambridge University Press. Buchanan, J. M. (1965). "An Economic Theory of Clubs." Economica 32(125): 1-14. Buchinsky, M. (1998). "Recent Advances in Quantile Regression Models: A Practical Guideline for Empirical Research." The Journal of Human Resources 33(1): 88-126. Cornes, R. and T. Sandler (1986). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. New York, Cambridge University Press. Dragulescu, A. A. and V. M. Yakovenko (2001). "Evidence for the exponential distribution of income in the USA." The European Physical Journal 20: 585-589. Ehrlich, I. and Z. Liu (1999). "Sensitivity Analyses of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let's Keep the Econ in Econometrics." Journal of Law and Economics 42(1, Part 2, Penalties: Public and Private: A Conference Sponsored in Part by the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law School and the George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business): 455-487. Grim, B. J. and R. Finke (2006). "International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion." Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 2. Gruber, J. and D. M. Hungerman (2006). "The Church vs. The Mall: What Happens When Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition." Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(2): 831-862. Hamermesh, D. S. (2000). "The Craft of Labormetrics." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 53(3): 363-380. Hungerman, D. M. (2005). "Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 Welfare Reform." Journal of Public Economics 89(11-12): 2245-2267. Iannaccone, L. and E. Berman (2006). "Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the Deadly." Public Choice 128(1-2): 109-129. Iannaccone, L. R. (1992). "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives." Journal of Political Economy 100(2): 271-291. Iannaccone, L. R. (1997). "Toward an Economic Theory of 'Fundamentalism'." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153(1): 100-116. Iannaccone, L. R. (1999). "Religious Extremism: Origins and Consequences." Contemporary Jewry 20: 8-29. Jones, A. F. and D. H. Weinberg (2000). The Changing Shape of the Nation's Income Distribution. E. a. S. Administration. Washington, D.C., U.S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Juergensmeyer, M. (2001). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, et al. (2005). Governance matters IV: governance indicators for 1996-2004, The World Bank. Koenker, R. and G. Bassett, Jr. (1978). "Regression Quantiles." Econometrica 46(1): 33-50. Koenker, R. and K. F. Hallock (2001). "Quantile Regression." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4): 143-156. Krueger, A. B. (2007). What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, Princeton University Press. Krueger, A. B. and J. Maleckova (2003). "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4): 119-144. Levin, J. (2001). "For whom the reductions count: A quantile regression analysis of class size and peer effects on scholastic achievement." Empirical Economics 26(1): 221-246. Levitt, M. (2004). "Hamas from Cradle to Grave." Middle East Quarterly: 3-15. Levy, D. (1982). "Diamonds, Water, and Z goods: an Account of the Paradox of Value." History of Political Economy 14(3). Luke, S., C. Cioffi-Revilla, et al. (2005). "MASON: A Multiagent Simulation Environment." SIMULATION 81(7): 517. Majumder, A. and S. R. Chakravarty (1990). "Distribution of Personal Income: Development of a new Model and its Application to U. S. Income Data." Journal of Applied Econometrics 5(2): 189-196. Marty, M. E. and R. S. Appleby (1995). The fundamentalism project, University of Chicago Press. McDonald, J. B. and M. R. Ransom (1979). "Functional Forms, Estimation Techniques and the Distribution of Income." Econometrica 47(6): 1513-1526. Munson, Z. (2001). "Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood." The Sociological Quarterly 42(4): 487-510. Press, W. H. (2002). Numerical recipes in C++ : the art of scientific computing. New York, Cambridge University Press. Stark, R. and W. S. Bainbridge (1985). The Future of Religion. Berkeley, University of California Press. Stark, R. and R. Finke (2000). Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley, University of California Press. Stern, J. (2003). Terror in the name of God: why religious militants kill. New York, Ecco. Stigler, G. J. and G. S. Becker (1977). "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum." The American Economic Review 67(2): 76-90. Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/14358 |