Drakopoulos, Stavros A. (1995): Towards a Hierarchical Approach to Trade Union Behaviour. Published in: Economic Notes , Vol. 25, No. No 1 (1996): pp. 47-56.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_15597.pdf Download (93kB) | Preview |
Abstract
The main starting point of this paper is the idea that trade unions do not only care about real wage level but also about a reference or aspiration wage level. After citing a number of empirical works, the paper argues that the attainment of the reference wage is a priority for the union. This implies that there is a hierarchical character in union objectives. A two-step union utility function is suggested in order to capture the change in priority once the prime objective (the reference wage level) was reached. The analysis is conducted in an efficient bargain framework, and shows that employment-wage combinations come into the picture only when the reference wage is reached. In a unionized economy, this implies that substantial increases in employment will take place only after the union reference wage has been met.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Towards a Hierarchical Approach to Trade Union Behaviour |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Wages; Trade Unions; Trade Union Objectives |
Subjects: | J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J30 - General |
Item ID: | 15597 |
Depositing User: | Stavros A. Drakopoulos |
Date Deposited: | 10 Jun 2009 05:56 |
Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 04:11 |
References: | Akerlof, G and Yellen, J. (1990). The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, pp.255-84. Carruth , A. and Oswald, A. (1987). On Union Preferences and Labour Market Models: Insiders and Outsiders, The Economic Journal, 97, pp.431-45. Calmofrs L. and Driffill J. (1988). Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance, Economic Policy, 6 pp.13-62. Drakopoulos, S. and Skatun, J. (1992), Altruism, Union Utility and Outsiders, University of Aberdeen mimeo. Drakopoulos, S. (1994). Hierarchical Choice in Economics, Journal of Economic Surveys, 8, pp.133-153. Duesenberry, J S. (1949). Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behaviour, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Eckstein, O and Wilson, T. (1962). The Determination of Money Wages in American Industry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 76, pp.379-414. Flanagan, R. (1976). Wage Interdependence in Unionized Labor Markets, Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 3, pp.635-73. Flanagan, R.,Moene K. and Wallerstein, M (1993) Trade Union Behaviour, Pay-Bargaining and Economic Performance, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Frank, R. (1984). Interdependent Preferences and the Competitive Wage Structure, Rand Journal of Economics, 15, pp.510-520. Gylfason, T. and Linbeck, A. (1984). Competing Wage Claims, Cost Inflation, and Capacity Utilization, European Economic Review, 24, pp.1-21. Gylfason, T. and Linbeck, A. (1986). Endogenous Unions and Govermnents, European Economic Review, 30, pp.5-26. Hamermesh, D. (1975). Inderdependence in the Labour Market, Economica, 42, pp.421-29. Hart, R. and Moutos, T. (1991). Efficient Bargains in the context of Recent Labour Market Experience and Policy, European Journal of Political Economy, 7, pp.252-62. Holmlund, B. and Skedinger, P. (1990). Wage Bargaining and Wage Drift: Evidence from the Swedish Wood Industry, in L. Calmfors (ed.) Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Policy in the Nordic Countries, Forlang: Oxford University Press. Jacoby S. and Mitchell, D. (1990). Sticky Stories: Economic Explanations of Employment and Wage Rigidity, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 80, pp.33-37. Jakobsson, L. and Lindbeck, A. (1971). On the Transmission Mechanism of Wage Change, Swedish Journal of Economics, 73, pp.273-293. Keynes, J. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, London: Macmillan. Jones, S. and McKenna, C. (1989). The Effect of outsiders on Union Contracts, European Economic Review, 33, pp.1567-74. Mayhew, K. And Turnbull, P. (1989). Models of Union Behaviour : A Critique of Recent Literature, in R. Drago and R. Perlman (eds) Microeconomic Issues in Labour Economics, London : Harvester Wheatsheaf McDonald, I. and Solow, R. (1981). Wage Bargaining and Employment, American Economic Review, 71, pp.896-908. Oswald, A. (1986). Is wage Rigidity Caused by 'Lay-offs by Seniority'?, in W. Beckerman (ed.) Wage Rigidity and Employment, London: Duckworth. Oswald, A. (1992) Satisfaction and Comparison Income, Oxford University Working Paper no 207. Summers, L. (1988). Relative Wages, Efficiency Wages, and Keynesian Unemployment, American Economic Review, papers and Proceedings, 78, pp.383-88. Swint, M. and Nelson. W. (1980). Self-Motivated Bargaining and Rational Strikes : a Multiparty Model and its Implications for Industrial Strike Activity, Southern Economic Journal 47, pp.317-31 |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/15597 |