First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders

Virag, Gabor (2009): First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders.

Abstract

If agents engage in resale, it changes bidding in the initial auction. Resale offers extra incentives for bidders with lower valuations to win the auction. However, if resale markets are not frictionless, then use values affect bidding incentives, and stronger bidders still win the initial auction more often than weaker ones. I consider a first price auction followed by a resale market with frictions, and con�rm the above statements. While intuitive, our results differ from the two bidder case of Hafalir and Krishna (2008): the two bidders win with equal probabilities regardless of their use values. The reason is that they face a common (resale) price at the relevant margin, a property that fails with more than two bidders. Numerical simulations show that asymmetry in winning probabilities increases in the number of bidders, and in large markets resale loses its e¤ect on allocations.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: auction, resale
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions

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