Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.

Cotton, Christopher (2007): Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.

Abstract

A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about his private valuation over time (as he has more time to consider using the item), and (2) there is a positive probability he is unable to return to the auction to submit a bid in a later period.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Cornell University
• Language: English
• Keywords: auction; multiple bidding; eBay; value discovery
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions

References

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