Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators

Knack, Stephen and Keefer, Philip (1995): Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators. Published in: Economics and Politics , Vol. 7, No. 3 (November 1995): pp. 207-228.

Abstract

This paper compares more direct measures of the institutional environment with both the instability proxies used by Barro (1991) and the Gastil indices, by comparing their effects both on growth and private investment. The results provide substantial support for the position that the institutional roots of growth and convergence are significant. The marked improvement that these new variables represent over existing proxies also suggests that there are substantial returns to future research into variables that reflect the security of property rights and the efficiency with which states determine economic policies and allocate public goods.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: governance, institutions, growth, property rights
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth

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