Berg, Nathan (2009): Illusive competition in school reform: Comment on Merrifield's "Imagined evidence and false imperatives". Published in: Journal of School Choice , Vol. 3, No. 3 (2009): pp. 290-306.
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Abstract
Merrifield (2009) provides a useful polemic about the sad state of data analysis too frequently encountered in the school choice literature. The available data come mostly from limited policy experiments with only modest amounts of choice and competition. These data are then misapplied in debates about more dramatic shifts to new systems to supply educational services that aim for large expansions of choice and competition. It is difficult to cleanly separate theoretical priors from empirical evidence. I contend that it is possible to make a stronger empirical case for dramatic school reform. But doing so would require dealing with six potential pitfalls based on economic theory that might arise when attempting to move to school systems more reliant on private providers of educational services. Given the difficulty of policy experiments, this is a high evidential bar, and may leave us stuck in an unfortunate status quo, as Merrifield suggests. More detailed definitions of competition together with bold, new empirical evidence are clear priorities for advancing debates over school reform, and should be core elements of prescriptive policy analysis.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Illusive competition in school reform: Comment on Merrifield's "Imagined evidence and false imperatives" |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Behavioral Economics, Education Economics, Experimental Economics, Policy Experiment, Bounded Rationality, Ecological Rationality, As-If, Methodology, Choice, Procedural Rationality, Normative Economics |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I20 - General |
Item ID: | 26371 |
Depositing User: | Nathan Berg |
Date Deposited: | 04 Nov 2010 09:17 |
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2019 16:33 |
References: | Berg, N. (2003). Normative behavioral economics. Journal of Socio-Economics, 32, 411-427. Berg, N. (2008). Simplicity in institutional design. In Batie, S. and Mercuro, N. (Eds.), Assessing the Evolution and Impact of Alternative Institutional Structures. New York: Routledge, pp. 140-164. Berg, N. and Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Psychology implies paternalism?: Bounded rationality may reduce the rationale to regulate risk-taking, Social Choice and Welfare 28(2), 337-359. Berg, N. and Lien, D. (2005). Does society benefit from investor overconfidence in the ability of financial market experts?, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58, 95-116. Bowles, S., and Gintis, H. (2002). Schooling in Capitalist America revisited. Sociology of Education, 75(1), 1-18. Gode, D.K. and Sunder, S. (1993). Allocative efficiency of markets with zero-intelligence traders: Market as a partial substitute for individual rationality. Journal of Political Economy, 101(1), 119-137. Hanushek, E.A. (1994). Making Schools Work: Improving Performance and Controlling Costs. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institutions. Merrifield, J. (2009). Imagined evidence and false imperatives. Journal of School Choice, (this issue). |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/26371 |