Cooperation or rivalry? Employee’s effort and appropriate knowledge distribution as key elements for maximizing the profit of the firm

Martin, Pardupa (2007): Cooperation or rivalry? Employee’s effort and appropriate knowledge distribution as key elements for maximizing the profit of the firm.

Abstract

This paper is studying the evolution in the perception of the knowledge distribution and intra-firm operation and the way these factors affect the effort of employees. (organisational structure, back-office and front-office processes, etc. ) . The question this paper want to explore is whether “the employees shall cooperate or compete with each other and in what extent and how to minimize the negative effects and leverage the positive outcomes of both extremes”. This paper argues, that for specific group of the firms and professions, a rivalry among workers is more advantageous than for other and that the distinction is in the distribution of the knowledge in the firm at the top/centre/bottom level. The discussion at the end of the paper shows the practical applications, that firms might apply a right mixture of monetary and non- monetary tools to maximize the employees effort through simplification the knowledge flow and a case study is made, where the inflow of the knowledge and skills together with rising the level of rivalry are examined on leading entertainment group active in 3 Central- European countries.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: competition, effort, incentives, knowledge distribution , rivalry
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L82 - Entertainment ; Media; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M54 - Labor Management; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J30 - General

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