All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints

Kotowski, Maciej and Li, Fei (2011): All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints.

Abstract

Consider an all-pay auction with interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for the case of two players. In contrast with the second-price auction, making budgets more severe can depress the bids of unconstrained bidders

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: All-Pay Auction, Budget Constraints, Lobbying, War of Attrition, Common Values, Private Values
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions

References

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