Trunin, Pavel and Knyazev, Dmitriy and Satdarov, Aleksander (2010): Анализ независимости центральных банков РФ, стран СНГ и Восточной Европы. Published in: ИЭПП
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Abstract
On the basis of an overview of theoretical and empirical studies on central banks’ independence, the paper assesses the independence of the central banks of the former USSR republics including the RF, as well as those of East European countries. An analysis of the potential existence of a relationship between the banks’ independence and some major economic indices, such as inflation, economic activity, and budget deficit, was also performed.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Анализ независимости центральных банков РФ, стран СНГ и Восточной Европы |
English Title: | Analysis of independence of the central banks of the Russian Federation, the CIS and East European countries |
Language: | Russian |
Keywords: | central bank independence, inflation, budget deficit |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics > C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy |
Item ID: | 33595 |
Depositing User: | Dmitriy Knyazev |
Date Deposited: | 22 Sep 2011 12:57 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 23:52 |
References: | Alesina A., Summers L. Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence // Journal of Money Credit and Banking. May 1993. P. 151–162. Cukierman A. Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymakin Institutions – Past, Present and Future // Central Bank of Chile Working Paper № 360. April 2006. Kydland F.E., Prescott E.C. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans // The Journal of Political Economy. June 1977. Vol. 85. No. 3. P. 473–492. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/33595 |