Taxing pollution: agglomeration and welfare consequences

Berliant, Marcus and Peng, Shin-Kun and Wang, Ping (2011): Taxing pollution: agglomeration and welfare consequences.

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that a pollution tax with a fixed cost component may lead, by itself, to segregation between clean and dirty firms without heterogeneous preferences or increasing returns. We construct a simple model with two locations and two industries (clean and dirty) where pollution is a by-product of dirty good manufacturing. Under proper assumptions, a completely stratified configuration with all dirty firms clustering in one city emerges as the only equilibrium outcome when there is a fixed cost component of the pollution tax. Moreover, a stratified Pareto optimum can never be supported by a competitive spatial equilibrium with a linear pollution tax. To support such a stratified Pareto optimum, however, an effective but unconventional policy prescription is to redistribute the pollution tax revenue from the dirty to the clean city residents.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Pollution Tax; Agglomeration of Polluting Producers; Endogenous Stratification
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities; R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R1 - General Regional Economics > R13 - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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