Economy and power to tax

Estrada, Fernando (2012): Economy and power to tax.

Abstract

The paper aims to describe the evolution part of the economy and power to tax in Colombia. It also explains the failure of the government and the problems that have expanded public sector expenditures. Furthermore, we identify the aspects of political economy have influenced the evolution of the state. Describes why fiscal conditions in Colombia have affected distributive justice and social rights.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Power tax, fiscal policy, Colombia, state, Justice Fairness
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E64 - Incomes Policy ; Price Policy; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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