The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river

Béal, Sylvain and Rémila, Eric and Solal, Philippe (2012): The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river.

Abstract

We introduce the sequential equal surplus division for sharing the total welfare resulting form the cooperation of agents along a river with a delta. This allocation rule can be seen as a generalization of the contribution vectors introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007) in the context of TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the sequential equal surplus division.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Amalgamation ; Consistency ; Fairness ; Sequential Equal Surplus Division ; Sharing a river
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q56 - Environment and Development ; Environment and Trade ; Sustainability ; Environmental Accounts and Accounting ; Environmental Equity ; Population Growth; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q25 - Water

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