Armstrong, Mark and Chen, Yongmin (2012): Discount pricing.
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Abstract
This paper investigates "discount pricing", the common marketing practice whereby a price is listed as a discount from an earlier, or regular, price. We discuss two reasons why a discounted price---as opposed to a merely low price---can make a rational consumer more willing to purchase the item. First, the information that the product was initially sold at a high price can indicate the product is high quality. Second, a discounted price can signal that the product is an unusual bargain, and there is little point searching for lower prices. We also discuss a behavioral model in which consumers have an intrinsic preference for paying a below-average price. Here, a seller has an incentive to offer different prices to identical consumers, so that a proportion of its consumers enjoy a bargain. We discuss in each framework when a seller has an incentive to offer false discounts, in which the reference price is exaggerated.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Discount pricing |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | reference dependence; price discounts; sales tactics; false advertising |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D18 - Consumer Protection M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M3 - Marketing and Advertising D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness |
Item ID: | 39074 |
Depositing User: | Mark Armstrong |
Date Deposited: | 28 May 2012 13:14 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 11:41 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/39074 |