Isaac, Alan G (2006): Social Consequences of Commitment.
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Abstract
This paper begins with a detailed computational introduction to a classic ACE model: an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma. The paper presents a simple but fully coded object oriented implementation of this model. (We use the Python programming language, which is shown to be a natural ally for ACE research). Using these tools, we demonstrate that player type evolution is affected by cardinal payoffs. We then explore a possible social benefit to commitment, where 'commitment' denotes an unwillingness to surrender a reciprocal strategy.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Social Consequences of Commitment |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | ACE; agent-based; computational economics; iterated prisoner's dilemma; evolutionary prisoner's dilemma; commitment |
| Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling |
| Item ID: | 414 |
| Depositing User: | Alan G Isaac |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Oct 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Oct 2019 13:50 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/414 |
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