Papakonstantinou, A. and Bogetoft, P. (2012): Short Communication: DEA based auctions.
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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a simulation framework which we use to numerically evaluate the Hybrid DEA - Second Score Auction. In a procurement setting, the winner of the Hybrid auction by design receives payment at the most equal to the second score auction. It is therefore superior to the traditional second score scheme from the point of view of a principal interested in acquiring an item at the minimum price without losing in quality. For a set of parameters we quantify the size of the improvements. We show in particular that the improvement depends intimately on the regularity imposed on the underlying cost function. In the least structured case of a variable returns to scale technology, the hybrid auction only improved the outcome for a small percentage of cases. However, for those few cases the improvement introduced by the hybrid auction is signicant. For other technologies with constant returns to scale, the gains are considerably higher and payments are lowered in a large percentage of cases. In the simulations, we furthermore calculate the eect of the number of the participating agents, the concavity of the principal value functions, and the number of quality dimensions.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Short Communication: DEA based auctions |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Multi-dimensional auctions; Data envelopment analysis; Second score auction; Yardstick competition; Hybrid auction; |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics > C44 - Operations Research ; Statistical Decision Theory D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design |
Item ID: | 44238 |
Depositing User: | Athanasios Papakonstantinou |
Date Deposited: | 06 Feb 2013 19:32 |
Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2019 04:46 |
References: | [1] P. Bogetoft, K. Nielsen, Dea based auctions, European Journal of Operational Research 184 (2008) 685-700. [2] P. Bogetoft, L. Otto, Benchmarking with DEA, SFA, and R, Springer, New York, 2011. [3] P. Bogetoft, L. Otto, Benchmark Package, Technical Report, R, 2012 [4] Y.-K. Che, Design competition through multidimensional auctions, RAND Journal of Economics 24 (1993) 668-680. [5] N. Costantino, M. Dotoli, M. Falagario, and F. Sciancalepore. Balancing the additional costs of purchasing and the vendor set dimension to reduce public procurement costs. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 18(3):189{198}, 2012. [6] M. Falagario, F. Sciancalepore, N. Costantino, and R. Pietroforte. Using a dea-cross efficiency approach in public procurement tenders. European Journal of Operational Research, 218:523{529}, 2012. [7] A. Mas-Collel, M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Mircoeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/44238 |
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Short Communication: DEA based auctions. (deposited 05 Jan 2013 03:14)
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