Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value in Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis in Five Countries (France, Italy, Japan, UK, USA)

Monda, Barbara and Giorgino, Marco (2013): Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value in Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis in Five Countries (France, Italy, Japan, UK, USA).

Abstract

In this paper, we design a multi-dimensional index to measure the quality of Corporate Governance systems adopted by firms and use it to investigate the correlation between Corporate Governance quality and firm value. Unlike most studies that examine the relationship between only one dimension of Governance and firm value, we present a complex index (CGI) composed of 39 variables referable to four dimensions: Board, Remuneration, Shareholder Rights and Disclosure. By analysing a sample of 100 large companies listed on the main stock markets in five different countries over three years (2009-2011), we confirm the widespread hypothesis of the existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between Corporate Governance, as measured by a subset of 12 variables, and firm value.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance Index, firm value
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance

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