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Fast and Furious (and Dirty): How Asymmetric Regulation May Hinder Environmental Policy

Huse, Cristian (2014): Fast and Furious (and Dirty): How Asymmetric Regulation May Hinder Environmental Policy.

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Abstract

In the first year after the inception of the Swedish Green Car Rebate (GCR), green cars had carved over 25 percent market share in the new vehicle market, an effect of unprecedented scale if compared to recent policies incentivizing the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles. By awarding vehicles satisfying certain emission criteria a rebate, but giving alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs, those able to run on alternative fuels) a more lenient treatment than regular fuel vehicles (RFVs, those able to run only on gasoline and diesel), the GCR created a regulatory loophole which led carmakers to increase the emissions of AFVs as compared to RFVs. This paper examines the impact of regulation on market developments comparing CO2 emissions (and fuel economy) of AFVs and RFVs. Once carmakers adjust their product lines to the policy, CO2 emissions of AFVs increased significantly as compared to those of RFVs, thus undermining the very objectives of the GCR.

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