Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures

Ojo, Marianne (2013): Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures.

Abstract

This paper not only considers why many concentrated ownership structured systems and jurisdictions are considering a shift to the Anglo American style of corporate governance, but also explores why the traditional principal agency theory model may no longer apply in many concentrated ownership structures.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: principal agent theory; stakeholder theory; informational asymmetries; risk; corporate governance; UK; India; Germany; U.S; Japan
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law

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