Efficacy of a Bidder Training Program: Lessons from LINC

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Hubbard, Timothy P. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia (2013): Efficacy of a Bidder Training Program: Lessons from LINC.

Abstract

In an effort to accommodate a change in the U.S. Federal Highway Administration's goals towards "race-neutral methods" concerning the involvement of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in procurement contracting, the Texas Department of Transportation created a Learning, Information, Networking and Collaboration (LINC) bidder training program. We examine the costs, benefits, and efficacy of this program using ten years of data, leveraging firm-specific bidding patterns with participation dates. We study participation, entry and bidding patterns of LINC-trained relative to untrained firms. We also analyze market power effects and the survival rates of LINC graduates.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Auctions, bidder training, disadvantaged business enterprises
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5 - Econometric Modeling > C54 - Quantitative Policy Modeling; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions

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