Институционална еволюция на обществата към отворен достъп и пазарна размяна?

Sedlarski, Teodor (2012): Институционална еволюция на обществата към отворен достъп и пазарна размяна? Published in: Economic Alternatives , Vol. 3, (October 2012): pp. 81-102.

Abstract

This article investigates the analytical line of reasoning in D. North’s, J. Wallis’ and B. Weingast’s research project “Violence and Social Orders”, which unifies in an institutional explanation scheme the control over violence in human societies, the equilibrium of interests among the ruling coalition that secures the peace, and the possible transition to impersonal exchange. As the market exchange isn’t a naturally given form of organizing social interaction, but requires erecting of specific institutional settings, this study demonstrates the new institutional approach to the explanation of the developments in economic history which made free markets and the democratic state organization possible during the European Renaissance. Research projects like Nort’s, Wallis’ and Weingast’s pave the way for creating a modern political economy, which - based on a contemporary analytical apparatus – synthesizes the achievements in the social sciences of the last decades with the tradition of the early economic thought.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Institutional Evolution of Societies towards Open Access and Market Exchange?
• Language: Bulgarian
• Keywords: new economic history, institutional economics, political economy, open access societies, limited access societies, rule of law, impersonal exchange, monopoly of organized violence
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B23 - Econometrics ; Quantitative and Mathematical Studies; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B25 - Historical ; Institutional ; Evolutionary ; Austrian; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z10 - General

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