Interaction between Vertical and Horizontal tax Competition: Theory and Evidence

Rizzo, Leonzio (2005): Interaction between Vertical and Horizontal tax Competition: Theory and Evidence.

Abstract

We develop a model with two provinces, producing two goods: one mobile and the other not. The mobile good is taxed according to the destination principle by the local government; it is also federally taxed. People decide to buy the good at the most advantageous price. Namely they can buy bootlegged cigarettes and, if the price is very high in both provinces, they can decide to buy smuggled cigarettes, on which no tax is levied. The two provinces engage in tax competition. The province tax-reaction function are non linear because of scale economies in the cost of bootlegging. An increase in federal tax offsets the non linearity, because it decreases the magnitude of the horizontal externality. We test the theoretical results by using Canada-US data set from 1984-1994.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Università degli studi di Ferrara
• Language: English
• Keywords: horizontal externality; vertical externality; tax competition; tax rate
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H70 - General; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General

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