An Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals

Foley, Maggie and Cebula, Richard and Boylan, Robert (2014): An Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals.

Abstract

We intend to reveal the causes and the determinants of the omitted shareholder proposals. We find that individual investors are mostly likely to submit a proposal being excluded from the proxy ballot. Since individual investors are not so skillful as institutional investors, we summarize that shareholder proposals are excluded mainly due to sponsors’ lack of experience and knowledge, rather than as a self-serving vehicle for shareholder activists to gain bargaining power or to simply annoy management. We also find that most shareholder proposals are omitted because they deal with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corporate governance; shareholder proposals
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G39 - Other

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